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THE COMMODITY PROBLEM AND LATIN AMERICA
Nonfuel primary products have accounted for a steadily declining percentage
of total Latin-American exports during the postwar era. Nevertheless, they still
represent a major source of foreign exchange for the region. In the first half
of the 1970s, for example, they represented over 40 percent of total regional
merchandise exports and over half of the individual country merchandise ex-
ports for 18 of the 24 major Latin-American countries which Montague J.
Lord [33] includes in his analysis. For the region as a whole and for many of
the individual countries, primary nonfuel exports will continue to be important
sources of foreign exchange during the 1980s, whatever changes occur in the
world economy.
The "commodity problem" refers to the allegedly detrimental impact on
developing countries of two dimensions of international primary commodity
markets: instabilities and declining secular trends. The instabilities are hy-
pothesized to be negative because of public and private problems of planning
under uncertainty, risk aversion, and asymmetrical responses, all of which
means that short-run transmissions of such instabilities to developing produc-
ing countries may have high costs in terms of short- and long-run economic
goal attainment. Declining secular trends are hypothesized to be troublesome
because of the importance of foreign exchange in goal attainment in develop-
ing countries and internal rigidities in moving factors in response to changing
comparative advantages. Latin-American analysts and policymakers long have
been in the forefront of those concerned about the commodity problem and
development. It is not surprising, therefore, that Latin Americans have given
considerable (although not unanimous) support for the revision of conditionsCOMMODITY EXPORTS AND NIEO 49
in international nonfuel primary markets that has been the foremost demand
of the developing countries in their quest for a "new international economic
order."
1
The framework for recent and ongoing explorations of changes in the inter-
national nonfuel primary commodity markets was established by the UNGTAD
IV [43 and 44] proposal and resolution of the Nairobi 1976 meetings. In the
second part of this paper we summarize this proposal, note limitations of too
simple a priori analyses of its impact, and summarize simulations of the impli-
cations of a UNCTAD type scheme for both of the dimensions of the com-
modity problem on primary commodity earnings in Latin America and other
developing countries.
Such an analysis is informative, but limited in terms of what it tells us
about the relation between goal attainment and the commodity problem in
Latin America. Therefore, in the third part we turn more intensively to this
question. We define broad economic goals, indicate why we think previous
studies on this topic tell us almost nothing of use, introduce a more satisfactory
approach of integrated econometric international commodity market — pri-
mary commodity sector — overall developing economy modeling, and present
some illustrative results for a specific Latin-American case study. In the fourth
part we give some concluding remarks.
THE UNCTAD INTEGRATED COMMODITY PROGRAM, THE COMMODITY PROBLEM,
AND PRIMARY COMMODITY REVENUES IN LATIN AMERICA
1
The UNCTAD Integrated Commodity Program
The UNCTAD [43] proposal emphasizes price stabilization for 10 core pri-
mary commodities through international buffer stock agreements. Thus focus
is on the instability dimension of the commodity problem. But there also are
a number of phrases that suggest the possibility of increasing the secular trends
of commodity prices and thereby dealing with the second dimension of the
commodity problem. Moreover, secondary operations are recommended for
commodities for which buffer stocks are not practical due to perishability,
other existing arrangements, and so on.
The original proposal designated 10 core commodities. Five of these are
significant from a Latin-American perspective in that they provide at least 1
percent of total regional merchandise export value (8 percent from coffee, 7
percent from sugar, 5 percent from copper, 2 percent from cotton, and 1 per-
cent from cocoa). Tin represents half of the merchandise export value for
Bolivia. Together these six core commodities accounted for 24 percent of
Latin-American merchandise export earnings in the first half of the 1970s.
The proposal also mentions eight other commodities which provided 10 per-
cent of total Latin-American merchandise export value.50 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
The UNCTAD proposal is called an integrated commodity program. The
main feature of integration is a common fund which would provide financing
for the core commodity agreements and, secondarily, would conduct "second-
window" lending operations for commodities not amenable to stockpiling, for
product diversification, and so on. It also would pool and reduce risks, have
more bargaining power in international capital markets than would a set of
individual stabilization funds for the same commodities, and would require
smaller total financing than the aggregate of a set of individual funds because
of differences in the phasing of cycles across commodity markets. The original
proposed magnitude of the common fund was $6 billion.
Negotiations over the details of the common fund have continued over sev-
eral years. The "Group of 77" developing countries sought paid-in capital
from direct assessments of about $2 billion, to be supplemented by borrowing
approximately $4 billion from capital markets. They advocated that about
one-quarter of the total would be used for "second-window" operations. The
"Group B" or industrial countries wanted financing by deposits from the indi-
vidual international commodity agreements instead of direct assessments and
initially opposed "second-window" operations.
A breakthrough occurred at the March 1979 UNCTAD negotiating session
with the resolution of the two major controversial issues: (1) In regard to the
basic capital structure, the negotiators agreed that direct assessment would be
$400 million (about two-thirds of which would be from Group B countries)
and that other financing would come from contributions of producing and
consuming country governments in each individual international commodity
agreement (amounting to one-third of the agreements' prospective financial
requirements). (2) In regard to the second window, the negotiators agreed to
establish such operations with funding of $370 million, but without any trans-
fers allowed from the first window. More than 100 countries approved a
plenary document which concerns these issues and refers further negotiations
and the drafting of the articles of the common fund to an interim committee.
Although some difficult issues remain (that is, the distribution of voting rights),
common fund negotiations well may be successfully concluded in the near fu-
ture. Subsequently ratification by national legislatures will be required.
Limitations of a Priori and of Reduced Form Correlation Analysis of Commodity Markets
The UNCTAD International Commodity Program has been evaluated and
criticized extensively. But most of these analyses are overly simplistic and there-
fore may be misleading.
One problem with many studies is that the results are sensitive to the as-
sumed forms of the supply and demand functions. For example, Harry C.
Johnson [27] argues that "elementary economics" demonstrates the incompe-
tence of UNCTAD economists, since they did not recognize the trade-off be-COMMODITY EXPORTS AND NIEO 51
tween price and earnings stabilization in their consideration of the impact of
buffer stocks on the instability dimension of the commodity problem. However,
Johnson's analysis of this trade-off depends upon his particular assumptions of
linear price-elastic curves and additive shifts, without any empirical testing.
With alternative assumptions different results are obtained!
8
Another example is provided by Lord's [33] recent empirical analysis of the
supply versus demand causes of fluctuations in Latin-American commodity
exports. By looking at the sign of the correlations between detrended quantities
and prices, he claims to identify whether the underlying shifts primarily were
in supply (negative correlations) or in demand (positive correlations).* This
approach is based upon reduced forms for simple supply and demand curves.
But Richard Porter [37] proves that such a test is valid only if the supply and
demand price elasticities are equal.
5 It seems very unlikely that the relevant
short-run elasticities are anywhere near equal for most of the country-com-
modity combinations that Lord considers. The market shares of Latin-American
countries for the six UNCTAD core commodities of interest generally are
small, with values higher than 10 percent only for Bolivia for tin, Brazil for
coffee and cocoa, Chile for copper, and Colombia for coffee. Thus the demand
price elasticities facing individual countries are probably very high, often
approaching infinity, since they are approximately the overall market price
elasticities divided by the market share of the individual countries. Lord's analy-
sis is appropriate only if the short-run country supply elasticities are equally
high, an assumption that does not seem to be grounded in empirical facts. As
a result, his conclusions seem to be suspect because they are not based on rele-
vant assumptions regarding the underlying structure (in this case, the elasticities
and the nature of shifts) of the markets.
8
Yet another problem with much of the simple theoretical and empirical
analysis is that all adjustments are assumed to be instantaneous so that fairly
long-run price equilibria are reached immediately. Both Johnson and Lord
and other analysts make this simplifying assumption. But in the real world
lags are considerable because of time required for adjustment of production,
consumption, and investment processes, and for the creation of expectations.
Such lags may alter substantially the outcomes from those implied by analysis
that ignores them, as the textbook explosive cobweb model vividly demonstrates.
Simulation with Econometric Models of UNCTAD Price Stabilization
for Six Core Commodities
We analyze the UNCTAD program with deterministic simulations of simple
econometric models of the relevant international markets for a recent historical
period. These models capture the time pattern of simultaneous and lagged
responses in supply, current demand, and private inventory demand relations.
The parameters in the models are those that are most consistent with observed
aggregate behavioral and technological responses. They differ from the Johnson-52 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Lord type of analysis in that decisions regarding a number of critical questions
(for example, magnitude of elasticities, additive versus multiplicative shifts,
pattern of lags) were made to assure as great consistency as is possible with
the historical data from these markets. Our models still depend upon a number
of important assumptions [7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, and 15], but simulation with them
provides a much better basis for this analysis than the frequency encountered
approaches with much stronger critical assumptions of the types that we have
already discussed.
7
We simulate operation of a "successful" UNCTAD Integrated Commodity
Program for the six core commodities of particular interest in Latin America.
It is successful in the sense that the buffer stock operators have sufficient fi-
nancial and commodity reserves to keep price fluctuations within 15 percent of
secular trends estimated from those that actually prevailed in the 1950-75
period. The simulation is conducted over a 13-year period so that ongoing
behavior of the agreement can be considered under a variety of external con-
ditions regarding world economic activity, and so on.
Magnitudes Involved In Simulated Buffer Stock Operations
For half of the six commodities, the buffer stocks must begin with initial
stocks in order to be able to defend the price ceilings throughout the 13-year
period. After establishing their initial position, the buffer stock authorities inter-
vene in the market slightly more than half of the time. Despite such a frequency
of intervention, there are long periods in which the buffer stock authorities are
not on the selling or not on the buying side. Also the interventions are more
than twice as frequent on the purchasing than on the selling side. These pat-
terns suggest that it might be difficult to be confident whether or not the target
price path around which the buffer stocks are stabilizing are in fact related to
long-run equilibrium paths.
The aggregate magnitude of financing for the buffer stocks becomes fairly
large after several years, even though there are significant advantages from
pooling finances across these six core commodities. For example, the sum of
purchases minus sales indicates that, on average, a total of about $1 billion per
year would be expended.
8 For half of these commodities, moreover, the maxi-
mum access to financing would occur in the first five years of operation. There-
fore, in about six years the buffer stocks would exhaust the $6 billion fund
originally mentioned in the UNCTAD proposal, even if only these six of the
10 core commodities were included and even if no second-window operations
were conducted. This occurs despite a gain from pooling across commodities
of about 21 percent by letting sales of one commodity offset purchases of other
commodities.
9 However, we make an important caveat. The model for sugar
seems much less satisfactory than those for the other commodities [13], and
sugar plays a very big role in these estimates. If sugar is excluded, the averageCOMMODITY EXPORTS AND NIEO 53
required access to funding drops 70 percent to less than $350 million per year,
with a 43 percent gain from pooling. This level of financing would be possible
for a number of years with funding on the order of magnitude proposed by
UNCTAD even if allowance is made for the four core commodities not of
particular interest to Latin America and for some second-window operations.
The net costs of this buffer stock activity (after adjustments for storage,
transactions, deterioration, interest costs, and buying-selling differentials) de-
pend critically on the value placed on the final stocks and on whether or not
the simulations for sugar are reliable. For all six core commodities the present
discounted value of operating the UNCTAD program for 13 years is $—7.0 bil-
lion if final stocks are valued at actual prices prevailing the year after the
simulations and is $—19.3 billion if final stocks are valued at zero. The most
realistic estimate presumably is somewhere between these two numbers, since
if all of the stocks were sold after the last year of the simulation, prices would
fall considerably, but not to zero. If sugar is excluded the two values are
$—0.7 and $—5.4 billion. The range is still negative and may imply fairly
large costs, but is of the order of magnitude that has been discussed in the
UNCTAD negotiations (and the upper estimate for this range increases only
to $—6.9 billion if the other four core commodities are added).
Such considerations about the simulated operation of the UNCTAD Inte-
grated Commodity Program suggest some reservations. There would be start-up
problems in about half of the agreements in that the price ceilings could not be
defended due to inadequate prior purchases, and such events would strain the
patience of consuming participants. It would be difficult to know whether or
not the target price paths were close to the long-run equilibrium paths from
the frequency or pattern of market interventions by the buffer stocks. Even if
the target price paths were the long-run equilibrium price paths, moreover,
considerable finances might be involved. If the target price paths substantially
exceed the equilibrium price paths, the required financing could become enor-
mous (see the section which follows). At the cost of reducing the price stability
around the long-run trends, however, the target price paths could be adjusted




On the other hand, the simulations suggest that price stabilization for the
core commodities of interest to Latin America (or of all of the core commodi-
ties) is feasible over a number of years with total financing not too much greater
than the numbers mentioned in the negotiations. If the estimates for sugar are
misleading because of inadequacies in the underlying model, if sugar were
excluded, or if a flexible target price path reduced the financial requirements
for sugar, the order of magnitude of financing would be within the limits dis-
cussed at the negotiating sessions.54 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
But these comments refer only to the direct costs of operating the UNCTAD
Integrated Commodity Program. We now consider the benefits and costs from
the point of view of the developing countries in general, and those in Latin
America in particular.
Implications of UNCTAD Program tor Developing Countries in General
and for Those In Latin America In Particular
The developing countries are primarily producers and exporters of the six
core commodities of interest. They account for virtually all of the world pro-
duction and exports of coffee and cocoa, almost a third of production and
over two-thirds of exports of cotton, and about three-quarters of production and
a slightly higher proportion of exports for tin. The developing countries as a
group import and consume a significant, although much smaller, proportion of
these goods. They account for 12 to 20 percent of world imports of sugar,
cotton, and tin — although only 4 to 6 percent of world imports of coffee,
cocoa, and copper. We focus on the producer-exporter role because that is the
more important one in the aggregate, but for a few developing countries the
consumer-importer role is significant, particularly for sugar, cotton, and tin.
We begin by discussing revenue changes for all producers, and then focus on
those in Latin America.
We first consider the impact on the levels of producers' revenues. Revenue
changes, of course, reflect movements both in quantities supplied and in prices
received. In regard to the former, the buffer stock activities induce fairly sub-
stantial supply responses for the agricultural products, some of which may be
destabilizing because of the lag structures. The percentage effects on prices,
however, are larger. Except for tin
1
1 the prices are changed in almost every year,
sometimes above and sometimes below levels that would have prevailed without
the buffer stock activity. The average price changes range from less than one
percent for the minerals to over 23 percent for sugar.
1
2
In some cases, the movements in prices and quantities reinforce each other.
In other cases they are opposing. The total effects are fairly significant revenue
gains for agricultural commodities and much smaller revenue losses for the two
minerals. For sugar the estimated annual average revenue gain is 23.6 percent,
which implies a present discounted value of additional producers' revenues of
over $10 billion. For the other three agricultural commodities the average an-
nual percentage revenue gains range from 2.4 for coffee to 6.7 for cocoa. The
total 6.1 percent average annual revenue gain for cotton, however, implies a
present discounted value of total producers' revenue gains on the order of
magnitude of $8 billion. Across all six commodities the total simulated present
discounted value of additional producers' revenues is somewhat over $20 bil-
lion. This gain is fairly substantial, with most of it accruing to sugar and cotton
producers and less so to coffee producers. We interpret the losses to theCOMMODITY EXPORTS AND NIEO 55
mineral producers to reflect the particular time period of our simulations. The
simulated price stabilization eliminates the mineral price boom in the late
1960s Vietnam War years. The lesson to be learned is not that stabilization is
good for agricultural producers and bad for mineral producers, but that during
any particular period there probably will be both losers and gainers.
We now consider the impact on the stability of producers' revenues. Johnson
[27] argues that under reasonable assumptions increases in revenues will be
accompanied by decreases in the stability of those revenues. However, as we
indicate in the second section, whether or not there is a trade-off between the
level and the stability of revenues cannot be settled a priori. It depends upon
the elasticities of the underlying curves and the nature of shifts in those curves.
The simulations indicate that only for copper is there evidence of a trade-off
between the stability and the level of revenues. In the case of copper, the buffer
stock program stabilizes revenues slightly, but with an accompanying somewhat
lower present discounted value. For the four agricultural commodities, revenues
are increased fairly substantially, and revenue instabilities fall significantly. For
tin there is a slight reduction in revenues with almost no change in the degree
of revenue stability. At least for the agricultural commodities, thus, the strong
critique which Johnson has made about the trade-off between the level and
stability of revenues does not seem warranted.
Now we focus on the Latin-American producers.
13 The present discounted
values of gains to producers in an individual country depend upon the total
present discounted value of additional producer revenues and the country's
marginal share in world supply. We assume that the marginal shares equal the
average shares.
1
4 Gross gains do not include any contributions to the financing
of the buffer stock operations. If the producing countries contributed half of
the net cost of buffer stock operations, the aggregate producer net gains would
be from 17 to 46 percent lower, depending on the evaluation of final buffer
stocks. Because of differential cost-sharing arrangements and final buffer stock
evaluations, it is simpler to discuss gross gains.
The largest absolute gainers in terms of products are sugar and cotton (be-
cause of the large overall gains for those producers) and the coffee producers
(because of the moderate overall gain and the large Latin-American share in
world production). The gains for the other three commodities are much smaller
and negative for the two minerals.
Therefore, the big simulated gainers in absolute terms among Latin-American
countries include $1,507 million for Brazil, $849 million for Cuba, $741 million
for Mexico, $431 million for the Dominican Republic, $328 million for Co-
lombia, $286 million for Peru, and $106 million for Jamaica. Smaller gainers
include Argentina and the Central American countries. Bolivia and Chile are
small losers. The total present discounted value of these revenue gains to Latin-
American producers is about $4.5 billion.56 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
We put these numbers in perspective by considering them as ratios to the
average annual value of exports in 1970-75. These ratios range from —2 to
97 percent. The big relative gainers are the Dominican Republic with almost a
year's export value (97 percent), and Cuba with over a half of a year's (55).
Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, El Salvador, Peru, and Jamaica all gain from a
fifth to a third of a year's export value. For all of Latin America the gain is
about one-sixth (16 percent) of an average year's export value.
Are such gains for Latin America small or large? The answer depends partly
upon the point of comparison. A total of $4.5 billion is not so small as to be
irrelevant. On the other hand, to obtain it requires the operation of the buffer
stock programs for a fairly long period of time. It is small, moreover, in compari-
son to the transfers of roughly $65 billion per year engendered by the 1973-74
OPEC petroleum price increases. Furthermore, some of the poorer Latin-
American countries (for example, Bolivia and Paraguay) would not benefit
from the simulated program. Finally, there are many other dimensions of pos-
sible gains and losses to which we shall return later.
1
5
Simulation with Econometric Models of Buffer Stock Program
to Change Secular Price Trends for Six Core Commodities
The second dimension of the commodity problem is alleged negative secular
trends. Over the 1950-75 period the secular trends in the deflated prices of
the six UNCTAD core commodities of interest to Latin America were —3.5
percent per year for coffee, —2.4 for cocoa, —3.8 for cotton, and insignificantly
different from zero for sugar, copper, and tin [7]. However, in the 1970s many
of these trends changed with improvements for agricultural commodities rela-
tive to the minerals [2]. Prior to UNCTAD IV the developing countries advo-
cated strongly "indexation" (that is, tying the commodity price movements to
changes in the import prices of the developing countries). Opposition to in-
dexation from the developed countries, however, also was very strong. There-
fore, in the UNCTAD IV proposal and resolution, no mention is made of in-
dexation per se, but a number of references are suggestive of such an effort.
Since the possibility of altering the secular price trends is a major factor in both
the strong support of some developing countries and the opposition of some
developed countries to the UNCTAD program, a brief consideration of the
implications of indexation (as one special case of so altering the price trends) is
useful.
J. R. Behrman and Pranee Tinakorn [15] simulate the effects of indexation of
all 10 UNCTAD core commodities to the 1963 price levels for a 13-year period.
The results suggest that indexation is not likely to be politically feasible for all
10 core commodities, nor for the 6 of interest to Latin America. Buffer stock
interventions are required in every year and for most commodities usually only
on one side of the market. The present discounted value of buffer stock activi-COMMODITY EXPORTS AND NIEO 57
ties is large: —$142 billion for all 10 core commodities, —$70 billion if sugar
is excluded, —$93 billion for the core commodities of interest to Latin America,
—$21 billion for the core commodities of interest to Latin America excluding
sugar.
1
6 The required financial access suggests numbers of a similar order of
magnitude. Therefore scepticism seems warranted about the feasibility of
persuading consuming countries to agree to or to allow changing the secular
trends for long nearly as much as would be required for indexation.
THE COMMODITY PROBLEM AND GOAL ATTAINMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY
The foregoing discussion of the impact of the commodity problem on Latin-
American and other developing countries is suggestive, but quite partial. It is
partial because it focuses on what happens to revenues from primary commodi-
ties. But what is of interest from a national policy point of view is the impact of
the commodity problem on more basic economic goal attainment, not on these
revenues. The latter only serve as a transmission mechanism through which
the commodity problem is transferred to the overall economy.
We shall therefore provide an illustration of what we consider to be a much
more fruitful approach: simulations with integrated econometric models.
1
7
Major Macroeconomlc Goals of Latin-American and Other Developing Countries
We find it useful to designate four major goals for the Latin-American coun-
tries: (1) growth, (2) distribution of earnings and of economic power, (3)
short-run stability regarding employment, inflation, and capacity utilization,
and (4) the international position relating to net benefits from participation
in the international sector, including the degree of control over one's own des-
tiny. Of course different countries and different individuals and groups within
countries weight these goals differently in their social objective functions. We
are not so presumptuous as to impose an explicit social welfare function in our
analysis. We do think it important, however, to be cognizant of the multiplicity
of goals and the possible trade-offs among them.
Both dimensions of the commodity problem are hypothesized to have many
effects on the attainment of these goals. We attempt to structure our integrated
econometric modeling to incorporate these hypotheses in a following section.
We also wish to emphasize that the direct effects of changes in international
commodity markets on goal attainment may be dwarfed by the indirect ramifi-
cations within the overall constrained economic system.
Previous Studies of the Impact of the Commodity Problem
on Goal Attainment in the Developing Countries
Previous studies have investigated the impact of instability by using reduced
form models that relate export changes to various representations of goal at-
tainment in the developing countries on the bases of cross-section regression esti-58 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
mates. Prominent examples include [19, 22, 28, 29, and 34]. These studies,
particularly those by Joseph D. Coppock and A. MacBean, have shaped con-
siderably the conventional textbook wisdom in the developed world that there
is very limited empirical support for the often hypothesized negative impact of
commodity market fluctuations on goal attainment in the developing countries.
Elsewhere we review these studies in some detail [24; also see 34, 35, and 48].
We find them so wanting on a priori and methodological grounds that we
doubt that they tell us anything useful about the commodity problem and goal
attainment in developing countries. We shall list our criticisms and refer the
interested reader to the aforementioned reference for more details: (1) The
instability indexes do not relate to fluctuations around long-run trends and
have arbitrary weighting schemes. (2) The use of reduced forms confounds
shifts in the underlying structural relations with changes therein and gives un-
stable results. (3) The lack of specification of the structural relations leads to
probable omitted variable problems. (4) Policies are not represented and thus
the results are not controlled for policy impact. (5) Overall constraints on the
economy and on government and central bank behavior are ignored. (6)
The attention to the major macro goals is unbalanced, with almost all focus on
growth and almost none on distribution. (7) The estimates probably are sub-
ject to simultaneous bias since exports generally reflect internal and external
developments, but are treated as exogenous in these studies.
1
8 (8) The implicit
assumption of homogeneity across countries in structures and in lag patterns is
untenable. (9) Important short-run response paths are ignored.
A much more satisfactory approach is to use integrated econometric models
of the underlying structural relations in the primary commodity-producing
sector, the overall economy, and perhaps the international commodity market
of concern. The resource cost is higher than with the cross-country reduced
forms, but the assumptions in principle at least can be so much more realistic
that the returns in terms of useful understanding may be much greater.
The work of Paul Acquah [1] on Ghana and cocoa is seminal in this area.
He uses an integrated model of cocoa production in Ghana, the overall Ghanaian
economy and the world cocoa market to explore the impact of the introduction
of international buffer stocks for cocoa on goal attainment in Ghana. He finds
that cocoa price stabilization has dynamic benefits in terms of employment and
output.
We can criticize a number of features of this study: the micro relations do
not test for asymmetrical micro responses or for micro responses to variances.
The demand orientation is overly strong. Insufficient attention is paid to non-
growth economic goals. But given its promising nature and the severe resource
constraints under which it was conducted, we find Acquah's study to be an
impressive and suggestive effort.COMMODITY EXPORTS AND NIEO 59
There is one further study that is a hybrid of the cross-country and macro-
econometric structural approaches. C. Rangarajan and V. Sundararajan [39]
use very aggregate econometric models to simulate the effects of stable versus
fluctuating export paths for 11 (mostly developing) countries. They find im-
provements with greater stability in about half of the cases. The impact of better
secular trends are substantial in almost all cases.
The Rangarajan and Sundararajan study is more satisfactory than the cross-
country reduced form efforts. At least they allow for some structural differences
among countries, use a reasonable representation of instability, and apply some
overall constraints. But their overall economy models are so rudimentary that
it is not clear what their results really tell. The extreme Keynesian version they
use has no supply constraints and no price effects. Exports are exogenous.
Overall fiscal and monetary budgets are not imposed. Micro responses to vari-
ances and asymmetrical micro responses are not explored. The whole litany of
criticisms of macroeconometric modeling to date for developing countries is
appropriate [5, 6, and 11].
One must conclude that previous studies of the impact of the commodity
problem on developing countries reveal little about the effect of fluctuations.
By far the most interesting and promising approach is the integrated modeling
of Acquah, even though we have some reservations about the details of his work.
We shall not review the large number of studies that explore the impact of
changes in secular trends in the commodity markets on goal attainment in de-
veloping countries. They are more satisfactory than are most studies focusing
on the first dimension of the commodity problem. In regard to many details of
specification, nevertheless, we have strong reservations about the representation
of special features of developing economies and of all of the major macro-
economic goals. Our integrated econometric modeling for the present study
has improved on most of the previous efforts.
An Integrated Econometric Model for Chile and Copper
The next two sections explore the impact of the commodity problem on goal
attainment in Chile. Because there are over 300 endogenous variables in the
overall system, we neither present nor discuss the individual relations. Instead
we focus on the important general features.
The International Copper Market Submodel
Within the integrated scheme the submodel of the international copper
market can play at least three roles: (1) It can indicate how shocks in
copper-consuming countries (for example, business cycle fluctuations) or in
other producing countries (for example, political instability in Zaire) are trans-
mitted to Chile, including the lags in such transmission. (2) It can suggest60 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
what impact various international copper market policies, such as the UNCTAD
Integrated Commodity Program that was discussed in the second section,
would have on the copper prices and demands that Chile faces. (3) In cases
in which there is considerable market power (for example, Brazil and coffee,
Ghana and cocoa, Morocco and phosphates), it can represent the nature of
the feedback through the international market of national policies.
Our world copper submodel consists of three sets of relations: (1) produc-
tion submodels for each of the major primary producers such as that which is
described for Chile in the next subsection and for secondary sources such as
scrap; (2) the demand for current use by the major users; and (3) the demand
for current inventory accumulation (positive or negative). These relations,
government policies pertaining to international copper trade and US official
stockpiles, the exogenous levels of industrial activity in the major producing
countries, the price of aluminum and other substitutes, inventory holding
costs, and price expectations and the overall market-clearing identities deter-
mine short-run international copper prices. We refer to prices because our
model includes the segmentation which has resulted in "two-tier" pricing (US
producers' price versus rest of the world) in much of the past two decades. In
addition to this market segmentation, other important features include the
large role of secondary copper, the close and increasing substitution in some
uses by aluminum, and the impact of US stockpile changes. The effects of a
hypothetical UNCTAD-style buffer-stock policy are easily incorporated by
adding buffer-stock-operating rules to the overall submodel. Because of con-
siderable adjustment and expectation formation lags, the impact of any such
policy intervention or of other exogenous changes is distributed over a number
of years.
The Copper Sector
The copper sector is the direct linkage between the international copper
market and most of the Chilean economy. Fluctuations and secular movements
in the international copper market impinge first directly on the copper produc-
tion sector and then are transmitted through that sector to the rest of the
economy. Even though the backward and forward linkages in the traditional
sense of factor demad and supply are not very large, the indirect effects are
quite substantial because of the foreign exchange constraint on some dimensions
of economic activity, the dependence of government revenue, and induced
expenditures on copper and on foreign exchange constrained activities (for
example, imports), and the largely passive response of the monetary system to
government deficits and foreign exchange reserves. In addition to representing
the direct effects and the transmission of the indirect effects to the rest of the
economy of developments in the international copper market, the copper sector
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The Chilean copper submodel distinguishes between large-scale mining,
which accounts for about seven-eighths of Chilean copper, and small- and
medium-scale mining, which produces the rest. This separation is important
because of the different ownership, policies, and factor intensities of the two.
Before the Frei government of 1964-70, large-scale mining was dominated by
two US multinational companies — Kennecott and Anaconda. During the
Frei administration ownership began to shift towards Chile with an agreement
in 1967 under which the Chilean government eventually would acquire 51
percent control. In 1972 the Allende government nationalized completely large-
scale mining. In contrast, small- and medium-scale mining has been composed
of a number of small domestic operations throughout recent decades.
In the international copper market, Chile is a price taker. The Frei govern-
ment forced large-scale mining to switch from the US producers' price to the
generally higher London Metal Exchange (LME) price for their Chilean
exports. This (profitable to Chile) change reflects the peculiarity of the two-
tier copper market system, not that Chile generally has much market power
in the sense of being able to alter the international copper prices much by
changing her exports. The price of small- and medium-scale copper has fol-
lowed closely the LME price for decades.
Large-scale copper supply has an estimated short-run elasticity of 0.11 and a
long-run one of 0.18 with respect to the ratio of the copper price to costs, with
an underlying secular trend due to technological changes and expansion of
capacity. The costs are defined by input-output coefficients for domestic and
imported intermediate inputs, plus the wage bill. Small- and medium-scale
copper supply has estimated short-run and long-run elasticities of 0.14 and
0.66 with respect to the ratio of the copper price to costs, with the latter repre-
sented by the domestic GDP deflator.
For large-scale copper the estimated value-added production function has
a variable elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. The capital stock
input depends on investment, which responds quite elastically to expectations
concerning the future real price of copper, with a downward shift in the
Allende 1971-73 period because of limited access to traditional capital equip-
ment suppliers and because of critical skilled personnel shortages. Wages are
determined by general inflationary expectations and the size of nonlabor in-
come since the latter enters into the employer-union bargaining over wage
rates, with an upward shift during the Allende years to reflect the shift in bar-
gaining power towards labor. Maximization of net revenues given the VES
production function, the stock of capital, the level of output, and labor gives
the desired demand for labor. Actual labor employed adjusts slowly towards
the desired level. The same maximization can be interpreted as giving average
labor productivity, which is estimated to respond positively to capital stock per
laborer, but with a downward shift in productivity during the Allende regime62 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
because of strikes, political turmoil, less attention to efficiency, and the negative
impact on productivity of nationalization. In any case, the wage bill that is de-
termined by this actual demand for labor and the wages feed back into the
total costs and thereby affect the supply of copper.
On the distribution side total value added goes to the wage bill and to non-
labor income. Before nationalization, nonlabor income was divided between
direct taxes and earnings of the foreign owners. The exact division depended
upon changing tax schedules with rates dependent on the price of copper dur-
ing part of the period, but the marginal tax rates at times exceeded 80 percent.
After the nationalization, all nonlabor returns go to the government. Both before
and after nationalization, at times a disadvantageous exchange rate has been
used by the government for large-scale mining expenditures on inputs (of
course, after nationalization the revenue effect of this distortion was to shift
resources from one part of the government to another). The combination of
this exchange rate policy, high wages, low productivity, and low copper prices
caused nonlabor income to fall 95 percent in 1971, the first full year of the
Allende government.
Responses throughout this model are distributed over time because of ad-
justment and expectation formation lags in supply, investment, and labor
demands. Thus the transmission of fluctuations or secular movements in the
international copper market to the rest of the Chilean economy is also distrib-
uted over several years.
The Overall Chilean Economy
The overall submodel of the Chilean economy is necessary to indicate how
the commodity problem, as transmitted through the copper-producing sector,
affects the degree of goal attainment in each of the four major areas which are
discussed in the first part of this section. It also is the locus of overall economic
policies, as opposed to those that directly impinge upon the copper sector, that
may be utilized to attempt to mitigate any perceived negative effects of the
commodity problem.
In order to represent the impact on the attainment of various goals and the
functioning of government policy within the framework of Chilean institutions,
the overall submodel of Chile is relatively large. It includes relations to deter-
mine value-added in five sectors, aggregate demand components, prices, for-
eign trade, and balance of payments, labor demands and payments, production
capacity and utilization, and passive government and central bank policies. It
is estimated on the bases of annual data for 1960-76, with some earlier lagged
values in adjustment and expectation formation processes.COMMODITY EXPORTS AND NIEO 63
Impact of the Commodity Problem
Developments in the international copper market have a direct effect on
the copper sector and an indirect effect on the economy as a whole. The link-
ages of transmission include the copper sector demand for domestic intermediate
inputs and labor, the amplified Keynesian aggregate demand effect from
factor payments in copper, and induced governmental expenditures and money
supply changes, the impact of the foreign exchange constraint on certain
import categories, and the determination of expectations that alter investment
decisions. The transmission of fluctuations to overall instabilities and of secular
trends to longer-run goals is clear without further elaboration in general terms,
although one should recall the distributed lag nature of the transmission —
which might smooth short-term fluctuations.
There exists the possibility that fluctuations may not cancel out over a com-
plete cycle, but have longer-run impact. Most macro studies of developing coun-
tries do not well represent all of the various channels for such a possibility. This
possibility is incorporated in three ways:
(1) We test to see if there are significant micro responses in key investment,
import, and other expenditure relations to variances (or related measures) in
exports or in foreign exchange. A priori such reactions may be positive or nega-
tive due to planning difficulties and risk-averse behavior. The negative response
is usually emphasized, but risk-averse precautionary behavior may imply in-
ventory buildup or investment speedup in response to greater uncertainty about
future foreign exchange availabilities. In fact, we find very little evidence of
such a micro response, with small significant positive responses in government
consumption and overall consumption imports and a negative one in other
material imports.
(2) We include other possible micro asymmetries in response to upward
versus downward changes by incorporating nonlinear specifications of indi-
vidual relations. We find evidence of significant nonlinearities throughout the
submodel, particularly in the form of logarithms, inverses, and exponentials.
(3) We include possible macro asymmetries due to overall capacity con-
straints, circular flow constraints, government and central bank budgets, and
the balance of payments.
Through such means we feel that we give a fair chance to the "fluctuations
matter for longer-run goals" hypothesis.
Special Characteristics of Chile
All too often developing countries have been modeled by simple transplanta-
tion of models of the developed economies [5, 6, and 11]. We have tried to in-
corporate the particular features of Chile, many of which are common to a64 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
number of other developing countries, into our modeling. We give six illustra-
tive examples.
(1) Pluralism is a pervasive feature of most developing economies. Therefore
some disaggregation is required. We find evidence of heterogeneities in struc-
tures and in lag patterns, for example, across production sectors and across
imports for Chile.
(2) Overall product in developing economies is neither completely demand-
determined as in the sterotypic Keynesian extreme nor completely supply-
determined as in the classical extreme and in the input-output programming
tradition. Often there are differences across sectors as part of the pluralism.
We find evidence of such differences across sectors in the weight of demand
versus supply considerations, with both interacting to determine overall product
and with feedbacks through capacity utilization on prices and, to a lesser extent,
investment and foreign trade.
(3) Structural change is hypothesized to be a critical feature of the develop-
ment process. We believe that much of what is called structural change reflects
stable underlying structures with changes in the relative importance of various
components. For example, production may shift from primary to secondary
sectors with stable underlying supply and demand curves for both sectors
because of factor movements and differential income elasticities of demand.
Viewed this way, the concern about aggregate structural change is closely tied
to that about pluralism and also requires disaggregation. As was already noted,
we tried to disaggregate where appropriate.
In addition, however, we have tested to see if the radical political shifts in
the 1970s have affected our structural relations. There is evidence of such
shifts in a number of cases for the Allende 1971-73 period: downward shifts
in agricultural production because of the political turmoil associated with land
reform, in noncopper exports because of nationalization of many firms; upward
shifts in demand for manufacturers because of income redistribution (with a
significant subsequent drop below pre-Allende years under the Pinochet regime
due to income distribution shifts and import competition with trade liberaliza-
tion), in nonfood consumption imports because of income distribution (ac-
centuated under Pinochet because of trade liberalization), in capital imports
(that did not fall as much as the drop in investment alone would have sug-
gested), in current government expenditures due to the expanded government
role, in real wages due to explicit redistribution policies, and in the central bank
credit to the government to finance the expanded government activity.
(4) Government policies in developing countries often have a passive or
endogenous nature and not infrequently depend more on the use of quantitative
restrictions than in developed countries. The failure to recognize the passivity
can result in a substantial overstatement of government control. The failure
to recognize the use of quantitative restrictions may miss some of the channelsCOMMODITY EXPORTS AND NIEO 65
through which government policies do have an impact. We find evidence of
passive policy responses in regard to both current and investment expenditure
and particularly in regard to the determination of the monetary base by the
government deficit and foreign reserves. Our estimates indicate significant
responses to quantitative restrictions for some import categories (for example,
nonfood consumption imports), but little evidence for domestic variables.
(5) For Chile and for many developing countries the foreign sector plays
a pervasive role in economic goal attainment. Of course this observation is re-
lated to the core of our interest, and we have attempted to incorporate the
links to the foreign sector throughout our model.
(6) A striking aspect of the Chilean experience is the high rate of inflation
for decades and the hyperinflation in 1972-74 (for example, average annual
percentage price increases of 33 percent for 1960-70 and of 274 percent for
1970-76). As already noted, we attempted to incorporate the government
deficit-foreign reserve-money supply-price-wage nexus. We also find some evi-
dence of significant impact of inflation in the individual relations in the model,
such as the inverse one in the determination of real wages or the direct one in
private consumption.
Model Performance
We have subjected the model to a number of within-sample and beyond-the-
sample tests. We report only the mean absolute errors in 12-year dynamic
simulations for 1965—75 for a few major variables: 2.6 for GDP, 2.0 for private
consumption, 3.7 for public consumption, 5.7 for nonlarge-scale mining in-
vestment, 3.5 for imports, 2.5 for exports, and 6.4 for the GDP price deflator.
In light of the radical political shifts of the 1970s and the inflation throughout
this period, we think that these errors are remarkably small. These and other
test results give us a fair amount of confidence in our simulations.
Simulations of Impact of Fluctuations In International Copper Market
on Chilean Goal Attainment
We shall consider only the impact of copper price movements, looking first
at fluctuations and then at secular trends. We begin by examining the impact
of a one-period 10 percent decline in the LME price in order to investigate
the time pattern of the responses to such a shock. We then explore to what
extent there are asymmetries by considering the impact of a one-period 10 per-
cent increase in the LME price, and finally the combined effect of one-period
10 percent increases and decreases in the LME copper price. The table pre-
sents relevant percentage deviations from a base simulation with no such
price shocks for major variables on a year-by-year basis, and the average over
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One-Period 10 Percent Decline In LMf Price
In large-scale copper the immediate impact is a fall in production of —3.6
percent, in the wage bill of —5.0 percent, in employment of —0.5 percent, and
in nonwage income of —25.2 percent. For most of these variables the effects are
quickly dampened, although the lags in wage and employment adjustments
mean that in the second year the effects for these two variables are still relatively
large. After the initial impact in the first year or two, for most of these variables
the dynamics lead to values in some years for which the discrepancies from the
base solution are positive. For example, the large decline in wages reduces
total costs so that the export price to cost ratio rises 2.6 percent in the second
year.
A major transmission mechanism to the overall economy is through passive
fiscal and monetary policies. In the first year, primarily because of the drop in
government direct revenues from large-scale mining, government current rev-
enues in nominal terms drop —4.8 percent and induced current expenditures
in nominal terms drop —2.7 percent. Current public savings drop and are
covered by a 22.9 percent increase in real credit to the public sector. But the
immediate decline of —44.9 percent in the balance of payments more than
compensates for the increased loans to the government, so the money supply
falls by —6.9 percent in the first year. Prices are heavily influenced by the fall
in the money supply and also fall by —5.5 percent in the first year.
For many of the other variables, however, the first-year impact is small and
often not negative because of the lag structure. The larger decline in prices
than in government expenditures, for example, means that real public con-
sumption and total investment increase by 0.4 percent, with multiplier effects
inducing a 0.3 percent increase in private consumption and a 0.5 percent in-
crease in imports. The increased demand induces a 0.4 percent increase in
employment and real wages go up by 0.7 percent because nominal wages are
sticky, with the resulting redistribution towards labor also adding to the en-
larged private consumption already noted.
In the second year, however, the effects are different in a number of respects,
and disentangling the causal flows is much more difficult because of a large
number of lagged responses in addition to the simultaneous interactions. One
important factor, however, is that imports drop by —2.0 percent in part due to
lagged increased restrictions in response to the large foreign exchange depletion
in the first year. One consequence is that the resulting increase in the balance
of payments this time works in the same direction as another large increase in
credit to the public sector, so the money supply is 7.3 percent and the GDP
deflator is 1.8 percent above the base solution values. Real wages decline —1.1
percent in part because of the stickiness in nominal wages, which induces a
fall in private consumption. Real public consumption also falls —0.4 percent
because the induced expansion in nominal expenditures is less than the added68 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
inflation. Such factors cause general declines in demands and in production
(particularly in the secondary and tertiary sectors, for which there also is a
decline in the demand for imports for large-scale mining), so that GDP drops
by —1.0 percent.
In subsequent years the reactions are even more complex and more difficult
to disentangle. For most of the variables the absolute percentage discrepancies
approach zero. However, the largest absolute percentage discrepancies from
the base solution are not until the fourth year in a few important cases, in-
cluding private consumption and total investment. These long lags point to the
difficulty of analyzing the effects of fluctuations in the copper market on the
Chilean economy with too simple a model.
The impact on Chilean goal attainment of a 10 percent one-period decline
in the LME price, not surprisingly, seems generally negative. Over the first five
years GDP declines an average of —0.8 percent, investment drops by —0.9
percent, employment falls by —0.2 percent, wages and salaries drop by —0.4
percent, the GDP deflator rises by 0.5 percent, and the balance of payments
declines by —4.0 percent. The major exception, given an equalitarian ob-
jective function, is that income becomes more equally distributed even though
at a lower absolute level.
One-Period 10 Percent Increase In LME Price
The general movements are the same, except opposite in sign to those just
described and are not discussed in detail here. The impact on Chilean goal
attainment is, of course, generally positive. Over the first five years GDP
increases by an annual average of 0.7 percent, investment goes up by 0.4 per-
cent, employment rises by 0.3 percent, wages and salaries rise by 0.9 percent,
the GDP deflator falls by —1.1 percent, capacity utilization goes up by 0.6
percent, and the balance of payments increases by 3.0 percent. The income
distribution becomes more unequal, finally, with lower increments in poorer
agriculture than elsewhere and with lower increments for wages than for
nonwages.
Combined One-Period 10 Percent Increases and Decreases In LME Price
One way of representing the impact of greater instability in the international
copper market on Chilean goal attainment is to combine the two previous cases.
Under the assumption that the effects are additive, this is tantamount to con-
sidering the expected impact of adding an additional cycle of shocks with
absolute amplitude equal to 10 percent of the LME price and with equal
probability that the upswing precedes the downswing (and vice versa).
Once again we consider the five-year averages. The more unstable LME
copper price by this measure causes GDP to fall by —0.1 percent, investment
to fall by —0.5 percent, employment to rise by 0.1 percent, wages and salariesCOMMODITY EXPORTS AND NIEO 69
to rise by 0.5 percent, the distribution between sectors and between factors to be
equalized somewhat, the GDP deflator to fall by —0.2 percent, capacity utiliza-
tion to increase by 0.6 percent, and the balance of payments to fall by —1.0
percent. By such measures greater copper price stability aids in the attainment
of the Chilean growth and foreign sector goals, but at the cost of losses in
terms of distributional equity and short-run internal stability. Thus whether
copper market instability is good or bad depends on the weights that are at-
tached to the various economic goals in the appropriate welfare function. The
GDP, employment, and price effects are particularly small, however, and
probably are not significantly nonzero.
Simulations of Impact of a Changed Secular Trend In International Copper Market
on Chilean Goal Attainment
The second dimension of the commodity problem is a change in the secular
trends in the international commodity market. We consider here the impact on
Chilean goal attainment of a 1 percent increase in the secular trend of
the LME copper price. The effect of such a change in the growth rate is cumu-
lative with an increasing wedge between the base and the higher growth price
paths. The impact on the Chilean economy is cumulative, both because of the
ever higher price relative to the base price and because of the lag struc-
tures. But the induced changes are not monotonic because of simultaneous
and lagged interactions among the different paths of the economy. In fact,
there are sign reversals in the discrepancies from the base paths even after
9 or 10 years. Since we are interested in the effects of a sustained increase, we
focus on the induced percentage changes in the second quinquennium, that is,
in years 6-10. The last column of the table gives the average annual percentage
changes over this period.
Within the copper sector itself, the ratio of the export price to costs is in-
creasingly (although not monotonically so) above the base path, by an average
of 4.1 percent for years 6-10. This induces an increase in value added from
large-scale mining of 3.5 percent. Although added employment is induced for
the first six years, the response to the altered wage-to-price ratio is to substitute
capital for labor so that employment actually declines by —0.2 percent in the
second quinquennium. The income distribution within the copper sector shifts
away from labor, with an average increase of 9.0 percent in nonwage income.
The major transmission to the rest of the Chilean economy is through the
government fiscal and monetary sectors. Government revenues in real terms
are increased and induced government expenditure follows. Current govern-
ment savings tend to rise and credit to the public sector tends to fall.
1
9 In years
6-10 real public consumption increases by 0.7 percent and total real investment
(including both public and private investment) rises by 1.9 percent.
The general reduction in credit to the public sector outweighs the increase
in foreign exchange due to the improvement in the balance of payments, so70 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
the monetary base falls below the base simulation path after the second year.
The money supply is an average of —6.4 percent below in years 6-10. The
GDP deflator initially increases slightly, but after the third year the reduced
money supply and increased domestic production dominate, so that an average
fall of —6.4 percent is recorded in years 6—10.
Other important transmission channels are through the availability of
foreign exchange and the direct demand for domestic inputs. In part because
of the greater foreign exchange availability, reinforced by the overall greater
demand due to higher induced domestic production and income and lower
domestic prices, imports increase an average of 1.6 percent in years 6-10. The
fairly direct links in terms of providing inputs for large-scale mining, rein-
forced again by the general demand expansion, cause secondary and tertiary
production to rise by 2.1 and 1.2 percent respectively.
In relation to most of Chile's goal attainment, the impact is positive. In the
second quinquennium, growth is improved with a 1.5 percent increase in GDP
and a 1.9 percent increase in investment. In regard to distribution, the absolute
real wage increases by 1.4 percent and employment by 1.2 percent. In regard
to short-run stability, capacity utilization improves by 0.9 percent and inflation
falls by —3.6 percent. In the foreign sector, the balance of payments increases
21.5 percent despite a 1.6 percent rise in imports.
The major exception is in regard to the relative distribution dimensions. The
poor agricultural sector lags behind the rest of the economy and lower-income
workers lag behind nonwage recipients, in spite of general absolute increases.
CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the impact of the two dimensions of the commodity
problem on producers' revenues for the UNCTAD core commodities for Latin
America generally and on overall goal attainment in the case of Chile in par-
ticular. We argue that previous studies of the impact of international com-
modity markets on developing countries, particularly regarding fluctuations,
are flawed. We therefore examined in some detail the case of copper and Chile
as an example of the much more satisfactory integrated econometric model
approach.
In regard to the stability dimension of the commodity problem, we conclude
that a UNCTAD price-stabilizing buffer-stock Integrated Commodity Program
could provide somewhat increased and more stable revenues to Latin-American
producers in the aggregate, although probably not to producers of all com-
modities. The UNCTAD price-stabilization program may have other advan-
tages over alternatives by creating a new international organization in which
Latin-American and other developing countries have a stronger role than
in most older international organizations and by macro restraints on inflation.
But intensive examination of Chile suggests that international commodity priceCOMMODITY EXPORTS AND NIEO 71
stabilization does not unequivocally lead to better attainment of all economic
goals. In this case, for example, gains in terms of growth and the foreign sector
position may be obtained at the cost of distribution and short-run stability ob-
jectives. The overall impact, moreover, is not large.
In regard to the secular trend dimension of the commodity problem, increases
in the secular trend of international commodity prices obviously would increase
revenues for all Latin-American producers. The intensive case study of Chile,
moreover, suggests that such increases lead to improvement in Chilean goal
attainment in almost all respects, with the noteworthy exception of relative
distribution. The problem is how to obtain such increases. An UNCTAD-style
buffer-stock program could not sustain very large increases for long because
of the huge financial costs of doing so (for example, the indexation example
given in the second section). The characteristics of the UNCTAD core com-
modities are such that concerted producer cartel action to raise the price seems
very difficult to arrange.
These considerations suggest that the UNCTAD Integrated Commodity
Program and other international policies for the relevant nonpetroleum com-
modities are not likely to be a panacea for Latin America. Some gains may be
obtained from price stabilization, but not very large ones — and there are
costs as well. Participation in an UNCTAD type program quite possibly might
lead to slight secular improvements with their generally, but not exclusively,
positive impact on goal attainment. So might expansion of markets in Eastern
Europe and in Asia, as well as limited restrictions on supply. Possibly the
returns outweigh the costs for Latin America of participating in such ventures,
but they are not going to be spectacular. If the costs are large in terms of di-
verting attention from developing new exports or guaranteeing capital market
access, moreover, the net returns to Latin America may be very low.
NOTES
*The second part of this paper builds on work that Behrman undertook for the
Overseas Development Council project on the New International Economic Order
[18]. The third part reports preliminary results from the AID-WEFA project on an
integrated econometric investigation of the commodity problem and developing
country goal attainment for which Adams and Behrman are the coprincipal investi-
gators and Lasaga is one of an international team of project economists [2 and 32].
Behrman took primary responsibility for drafting and presenting this paper. We wish
to thank, but not implicate, the sponsoring organizations.
1. Elsewhere we review in much greater detail the hypothesized causes and con-
sequences of the commodity problem on goal attainment in developing countries [2].
For recent analyses of the new international order see [16, 18, 21, 23, 30, 40, and 47]
and the references therein.
2. This part of the paper builds on [7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15] which provide
much more detail.
3. For example, Johnson's tradeoff does not hold if the curves are sufficiently price-
inelastic, as many estimates suggest in fact is the case [7].72 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
4. There is a long tradition of making some inferences by this method dating back
at least to United Nations [45]. Another recent example is [17].
5. To see that elasticities must matter, consider the case in which one of the two
curves is stable and infinitely elastic (thereby fixing the equilibrium price) and the
other curve has less than infinite elasticity and shifts considerably. Even though by
assumption the instability arises from the movements in the latter curve, the Lord
method will give a zero correlation between prices and quantities and attribute the
instability equally to shifts in both curves.
6. In work under way Lord has estimated individual Latin-American country
supply and market demand price elasticities for copper and coffee withtin a com-
bined time-series and cross-country framework. The long-run supply price elasticities
which he obtains are more or less comparable in magnitude with his demand price
elasticities. However, this does not provide support for his assumption in his earlier
work of equal short-run supply and demand price elasticities, since these estimates
are long-run (not short-run, as are of relevance for the stability issue) and the de-
mand elasticities are with regard to the relative price of different suppliers of a given
product (which makes interpretation for the stability questions that he examined in
the earlier study difficult without a complete model in which the interrelations among
prices from various suppliers are specified). Although in our judgment this new work
does not justify his earlier assumptions, we applaud his moving from a priori assump-
tions regarding elasticities and lag patterns to empirical estimates. We think that when
his work is completed, it will provide a very useful tool for examining the implica-
tions of international copper and coffee market changes for Latin-American export
revenues. The advantages of his more efficient estimates from combined time-series
and cross-section data and from greater disaggregation should result in a better ana-
lytical tool than we use in this part of this article.
7. For the results in the third part following, we use a more detailed model which
captures special features of the world copper market. We do the same for coffee in
work which is summarized in [2, 3, 4, and 5]. The Lord study now under way also has
greater disaggregation and other advantages (see the previous note).
8. All dollar magnitudes cited in the second part are in 1975 US dollars.
9. This calculation of the gain from pooling depends upon the assumptions that
capital markets are not perfect and that individual countries participating in the
international commodity agreements could not do such pooling on their own. See [12]
for further discussion of these issues.
10. The simulations in [13] suggest that the use of variable target price paths (or
variable price bands) adjusted for actual stock accumulations can reduce substan-
tially the financial costs — of course, at the cost of some price stabilization.
11. Tin may be an exception because the international tin agreement and US
Government tin stockpile activities apparently kept prices fairly stable during the
sample period [42].
12. However, remember that there is some question about the sugar model.
13. This discussion draws heavily on material in [14].
14. A better assumption would distinguish among countries on the bases of differ-
ential supply elasticities and market power (as in the Lord study to which reference
is made in Note 6). We do not have such disaggregate models, however, for all of
the UNCTAD core commodities. Therefore, we make this assumption here to ob-
tain crude Latin-American country estimates.
15. In regard to the possibility of implementing and sustaining the UNCTAD
program, there also is an important question regarding the gains and losses for the
developed countries. The developed countries as a group are primarily importers andCOMMODITY EXPORTS AND NIEO 73
consumers of these six core commodities. They account for the following percentages
of world imports: coffee (90), copper (87), tin (81), cocoa (78), sugar (65), and
cotton (51). They enter into production and exporting in a less extensive way, but
still account for over 40 percent of world copper production and exports, over 20
percent of world sugar and cotton production and exports, and 16 percent of world
tin exports [7].
In their role as consumers, benefits include more stable commodity prices per se
and possibly greater assurance of access to supply. The costs include possibly some-
what higher prices for the commodities, the consumers' share of the cost of running
the UNCTAD program, and the possible development of a new entity in interna-
tional primary commodity markets that may have significant market power and that
probably would be less responsive to the developed countries' interests than to those
of the developing countries. In their secondary role as producers and exporters, of
course, the effects are similar to those emphasized in the text for the developing
countries.
There also may be some more important indirect macro effects. The stabilization
of commodity prices may lessen inflationary pressures if there are asymmetries due
to ratchet effects of private oligopsonists anywhere in the economy that use com-
modity prices directly or indirectly to signal adjustments or due to government re-
sponses [7]. The stabilization of producers' revenues in the developing countries also
may stabilize their demand for imports from the developed countries, with a stabiliz-
ing impact on short-run fluctuations. In an increasingly interdependent world, of
course, both of these effects would have some secondary benefits for developing
country producers by stabilizing demands that they face and the prices that they
must pay for imports from the developed countries.
16. The implications of excluding sugar are indicated because of the doubts about
the underlying model that have already been mentioned.
17. In this part of the paper we sketch some of the results from the AID-WEFA
project on Integrated Econometric Modeling of the Commodity Problem and Goal
Attainment in Developing Countries. This project includes intensive examination of
two commodity-country combinations: Coffee — Brazil, Central America, and Ivory
Coast; and copper — Chile and Zambia. The results are forthcoming in [2, 3, 32,
36, 38, and 41]. For an earlier report see [4].
18. This problem is more severe if the developing country has a big enough share
in the world commodity markets to have some market power.
19. Current government revenues and expenditures and government savings in-
crease in 9 of the first 11 years. However, fairly large declines below the base paths
in years 9 and 10 cause the averages over years 6-10 for current government revenues
and expenditures to be negative and that for credit to the public sector to be slightly
positive. Over a longer period the latter is negative, and the large declines in the
first five years outweigh the increases in years 9 and 10 in regard to the impact on
the monetary base.
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Comment on "Commodity Exports and NIEO Proposals
for Buffer Stocks and Compensatory Finance"
Montague J. Lord
Inter-American Development Bank
The Adams-Behrman-Lasaga (A-B-L) paper is an empirical analysis of two
separate, though interrelated, classic issues in the export instability literature:
the first part deals with the effect of price stabilization on export earnings, and
the second with the impact of export instability on growth and development.
I shall treat these two issues in that order.
IMPACT OF PRICE STABILIZATION ON REVENUE
A-B-L begin by criticizing the a priori analysis of the impact of price stabili-
zation on export earnings, specifically Harry G. Johnson [4] for using an alge-
braic proof to demonstrate that the impact of price stabilization will depend on
the source of the market disruption for the average level of export earnings;
and, for the degree of earnings, that instability will additionally depend on
the price elasticity of supply and demand. Furthermore, if instability is due to
demand disturbances, price stabilization will reduce the level of earnings below
what they would be in an unrestricted market; and if instability is due to sup-
ply disturbances, price stabilization will increase the level of earnings.
Next they criticize the paper I presented at the first of this conference series
[10] for regressing detrended quantum exports against prices as a method of
identifying the source of the disturbance in order to deduce the impact of price
stabilization on earnings, in accordance with Johnson's results. The basis of
their criticism of Johnson's and my approach is the implied elasticities; they
argue that the demand elasticities at the national level are very high, if not
infinite, in which case Richard C. Porter [14] has demonstrated that these ap-
proaches will bias the results toward supply-dominated disturbances.
As an alternative approach, A-B-L simulate the operation of buffer stock
arrangements. Adams and Behrman were among the first to attempt a rigorousCOMMODITY EXPORTS AND NIEO 77
measurement of the impact of the NIEO proposals for commodities on the ex-
port earnings of developing countries. The starting point of their studies of
stabilization policy alternatives is a set of simple structural econometric models
developed earlier [1, 2, and 3]. They fit the data for commodities included in
the UNCTAD Integrated Program for Commodities to a common model
specification that assumes competitive market behavior, even though most of
die products simulated operate in an oligopolistic market structure. Further-
more, their multiplier simulations show that the model price responses to
stocks tend to be sluggish, whereas price sensitivity in models designed for buffer
stock simulations is essential if the objective is to avert price volatility. Con-
sequently, such models tend to generate different results from those of other
model formulations [8].
Because they reject an a priori analysis, the results of their paper are only as
good as the models. Difficulties therefore arise. Thus, when sugar stabilization
is found to cause a sharp increase in buffer stock funding, they remove it from
the analysis on the grounds that the model used for simulations is poor, but
they reintroduce it later when sugar, cotton, and coffee producers are found to
achieve large gains in earning from price stabilization. Worse still, without an
a priori analytical framework, A-B-L cannot seem to derive any substantive
or policy-oriented conclusions. When price stabilization is found generally to
improve the earnings of agriculture and worsen those of minerals, they attribute
this result solely to the particular period chosen for the simulation. At this point,
some allusion to the vast literature on the consequences of supply- versus de-
mand-dominated sources of instability would certainly be warranted. But be-
cause A-B-L rely solely on quantitative analysis, they are unable to draw gen-
eral conclusions.
Despite these limitations, A-B-L's results provide important quantitative
evidence of the direction of the potential effects of price stabilization on the
world markets for primary commodities. But not for the Latin-American
economies. In examining the benefits and costs of price stabilization for the
Latin-American economies, they rely on simplistic assumptions that result in
misleading and erroneous conclusions. Thus, they assume that the distribution
of benefits or losses to exporters is proportional to their respective shares in
world production.
Yet where supply or supply/demand instability dominates, it is only the large
producers that are likely to gain; the nonmajor producers suffer declines in
their export earnings under price stabilization. As the chart illustrates, a price
stabilization scheme that responded to supply changes in the market would
have a direct effect only on the source of the disturbance. This effect would be
to raise the level of earnings of the country. For those producers that respond
to external supply-induced market surplus or deficit conditions, the extent of
the impact of price stabilization measures would be determined by demand-78 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION





















shift disturbances. Nonmajor producers could not, of course, benefit from
their own supply disturbances, since a change in their export quantum would
not be sufficient to trigger stabilization measures. Hence, the impact of supply-
induced market disturbances on national export earnings cannot be directly
ascertained from the effect of price stabilization on aggregate producer earnings.
In order empirically to verify the conclusions reached in the paper I pre-
sented to the first of this conference series and to show the distributional in-
equality of price stabilization missed in the A-B-L paper, I have simulated two
of the dynamic disequilibrium trade flow models recently estimated for the
commodity exports of the Latin-American economies [11]. These models are for
the two products so far dealt with in the WEFA project of Adams and Behr-
man: coffee in Brazil and copper in Chile. They are two good products because,
in coffee, the market has been dominated by supply disturbances and Brazil is
a price-setter, while the rest of Latin America is a price taker; and because, in
copper, the market has been dominated by demand disturbances and the Latin-
American exporters are price-takers in the market.
Before my buffer stock simulation results are compared with those in the
paper, it is first necessary to correct A-B-L's erroneous assertion that national
export demand elasticities are very high, if not infinite. Since space does not
allow me to summarize the literature on models estimating demand functions for
primary commodities based on produce differentiation, I refer the authors to
George W. Ladd's 1979 review [9]; and, product differentiation as an important
factor determining international trade flows, to the recent work of Paul R.
Johnson, Thomas Grennes, and Marie Thursby [5]. The estimates derived from
my model also show that marketing and other nonphysical differentials sig-
nificantly influence export demand elasticities so that export demand and sup-
ply elasticities do tend to approximate one another. These estimates are based
on pooled regression analysis using cross-section and time-series data, sinceCOMMODITY EXPORTS AND NIEO 79
aggregate time-series estimates were found to bias the results downward. The
average elasticity of substitution for the Latin-American producers of coffee and
copper were estimated to be .9 and .3 respectively, compared with a mean elas-
ticity of export supply of .6 for coffee and .2 for copper. (A-B-L nevertheless
argue that my estimates are long-run and therefore not relevant to the stability
issue. In fact, of the nine Latin-American coffee producers, only Haiti's elasticity
of supply is calculated from the long-run response; all the others are short-term
elasticities. In copper, Chile's elasticity of supply is calculated from a one-year
lag, which is usually not considered long-run. On the demand side, only
Ecuador's price elasticity of substitution is calculated from a one-year time lag,
all the other elasticities being measured in the current time period.)
The table compares the results of the A-B-L paper with those of my own
model simulations. The most important differences are those for revenue
changes among coffee-producing countries. In the A-B-L paper, all producers
gain, since it assumes that the distribution of benefits or losses to exporters is
shared proportionately.
Dissaggregation at the producer level in my models produces quite different
results. As stated earlier, the supply-induced nature of instability in this market
implies an increase in the level of earnings under a price stabilization scheme.
But it is Brazil that has historically been the major source of instability, and it
is therefore Brazil that obtains the revenue gains. In contrast, the earnings of
the other Latin-American countries worsen. Even for Colombia, the world's
second largest producer, the revenue loss rate is only 10 percent below the
average for the other Latin-American producers. In the world market, the
COMPARISON OF NONINTERVENTION AND BUFFER STOCK SIMULATIONS OF
ADAMS-BEHRMAN-LASAGA (A-B-L) AND LORD AT + 15 PERCENT







































The reference price is assumed to be the secular trend.
Measured by the ratio of the index of earnings instability
with market intervention to that in an unrestricted market.
c-188 million 1975 dollars in terms of present discount
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net effect of price stabilization on earnings is virtually nullified by the divergent
individual producer effects.
As anticipated, the total revenue loss for copper producers in my model
simulations is substantial and approximately similar across countries, while in
the A-B-L paper there is a small gain, which becomes negative on a present
discount basis. The Latin-American producers' differential from the world
total effect is somewhat higher, but price stabilization in coffee has a near-
uniform impact on the level of export earnings of the individual producers.
As for the change in earnings instability, both my simulations and those of
A-B-L point to a decline. However, for coffee and copper, the reduction in my
simulated results is much greater. This may be due to either (1) the inclusion
of an additional three years in my simulation (1962-78, compared with 1962-
75); (2) the model specification; or, what is more probable (3) the estimation
of price elasticities in my paper on the basis of cross-sectional and time-series
data, and in A-B-L's paper on the basis of aggregate time-series data.
Thus, Johnson's strong criticism of the trade-off between the level and
stability of revenues does seem warranted, especially in the case of the nonmajor
exporters of a product.
EFFECT OF STABILIZATION ON DEVELOPMENT
A-B-L begin the second part of their paper by stating that the approach
used in the first part is only suggestive and partial, and that what follows is a
more satisfying way of examining the issue of export instability. However, Part
2 deals with the impact of stabilization on development, whereas Part 1 is cen-
tered on the effect of price stabilization on export earnings. To assert that these
are two approaches to the same issue is to disregard the vast literature on the
relation between export instability and development. I need only refer here to
the seminal work of A. MacBean [12], whose results were later corroborated by
Peter B. Kenen and C. S. Voivodas [6], O. Knudsen and A. Parnes [7], and also
Ben ton F. Massell, Scott R. Pearson, and James Finch [13] who used a country-
by-country approach for Latin America and found no clear relation between
export instability and development. I therefore strongly disagree that these two
issues should be treated as one, at least in the way the paper is presently
formulated.
Nevertheless, the results obtained in Part 2 are more satisfying to me because
of the greater disaggregation of the copper market and Chilean economy
models; it is far more difficult to comment on because the models are not
elaborated except in extremely general terms and, according to A-B-L, are
unrelated to their earlier published models on copper and Chile. My comments
can, therefore, only refer to their conclusions and to possible areas for further
research.COMMODITY EXPORTS AND NIEO 81
Multiplier analysis is used to evaluate the effect of a one-period 10 percent
increase and later of a one-period 10 percent decrease in world copper prices
on various components of the Chilean economy. The two effects are assumed to
be additive, and the results of the individual simulations are summed to evalu-
ate their combined effect. A-B-L find minor and divergent changes in the
economy. Next a 1 percent increase in the average annual growth trend of
prices is used to evaluate the effect of a secular change in copper prices on the
Chilean economy. The expected results are obtained: all economic indicators
improve except, not surprisingly, income distribution. This scarcely makes
exciting reading.
One of the major difficulties in this part of the paper is the nature of the
market. Since Chile is a price-taker in the international copper market, the
transmission mechanism between the product and national models is recursive.
Thus an interesting avenue of research when both the models of Chile and
Zambia are linked to the copper model would be the feedback effects between
the market and the national economies. Because Chile and Zambia together
account for about 37 percent of copper exports, the simultaneity inherent in
the models could provide more accurate results for the commodity-country
simulation results.
This part of A-B-L's research provides one of the most fruitful approaches
to examining the issue of export instability and development. The authors
deserve particular credit for their contribution in this area. After a decade of
controversy over the proper sample size and period to be used in cross-national
analysis of this issue, it is a relief finally to leave the forest and see the trees.
A return to generalizations will be possible when the present approach moves
from deterministic to stochastic simulation analysis.
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